A Decade of Difference

The 10 Ways Tactics Have Changed in the

Last 10 Years

as published in the Soccer Journal

1. THE FALL AND RISE OF THE PASSING MIDFIELDER

In 2004, Gabriele Marcotti wrote an article for The Times about Barcelona legend Pep Guardiola. It wasn't a celebratory piece looking back at Guardiola's fine career, nor remarking on his ability to defy the critics and keep playing at a high standard, like Paolo Maldini. It was about how, in 2004-spec soccer, Guardiola was useless. That is not to say that he had declined as a player. A physically unremarkable player, his domain was sitting front of his own defence and spraying passes across the pitch for his more illustrious teammates – Michael Laudrup, Hristo Stoichkov and Romario being amongst the biggest names to have benefited from his presence. When Marcotti wrote the article, at 33, Guardiola should have been at his peak.

But the reality was that nobody wanted him. In the early 2000s, Europe was tactically obsessed with two types of players in the centre – tough-tackling defensive midfielders, and classic Number 10 creators. Most big sides followed this destroyer-creator model, examples including Davids-Zidane at Juventus, or Keane-Scholes at Manchester United. And therefore, for the deep-lying playmaker like Guardiola, there was nowhere to go.

To quote Marcotti from that original article:
"His midfield skills have become obselete...the modern game has closed the door on players like Guardiola...despite being in the best shape of his career, there is no place for him...that the thoughtful, intricate passing patterns of players like Guardiola are lost to younger fans is somewhat depressing."

And quotes from Guardiola himself:
"I haven't changed...my skills haven't declined. It's just that soccer now is different. It's played at a higher pace and it's a lot more physical. The tactics are different now, you have to be a ball-winner, a tackler, like Patrick Vieira or Edgar Davids. If you can pass too, well, that's a bonus. But the emphasis, as far as central midfielders are concerned, is all on defensive work...players like me have become extinct."

That was in 2004. And now – in 2010, the current European Champions at club level are led by one Pep Guardiola, who has instilled his very playing style into Barcelona. This season he has regularly played with three Guardiola-esque players in the centre of his midfield – Xavi Hernandez, Andres Iniesta and Sergio Busquets (although Busquets is slightly more defensive-minded). Xavi and Iniesta also combined to make Spain the European Champions at international level. Just six years after Guardiola's mentality was considered dead, it is now the way to play soccer.

It is remarkable that so much can change in such a short space of time. The biggest factor in the re-emergence of Guardiola-esque players was probably the shift away from 4-4-2 systems in the mid 2000s, towards 4-2-3-1 and 4-3-3 systems, both of which broadly feature three central midfielders. This meant that there was an extra midfield place available, and the destroyer-creator model was altered to include a 'passer' inbetween. Hence Liverpool's brilliant near-title winning trio of Mascherano (destroyer) Alonso (passer) Gerrard (creator), for example.

But perhaps there has been a further shift – the mid 2000s obsession with deploying a player in the 'Makelele role' largely led to the decline of the creator as a traditional number 10 (as he was marked out of the game) – and that in turn caused the lessening importance of the Makelele role itself (since he then had no-one to mark). Therefore, the 'creator' now plays a deeper, more methodical passing game – hence Cesc Fabregas or Andres Iniesta playing as players at the head of a midfield three – whilst the 'holding' midfielder has also moved away from being a tackler, to becoming a passer himself – with Busquets and Michael Carrick amongst the beneficiaries. And suddenly, the midfield battle is not about being 'physical' or 'ball-winning' – it is all about passing, as epitomised by the Barcelona and Arsenal sides.

Of course, we should not fall into the trap of thinking that this type of player is a purely a Barcelona creation. There are other ball-playing midfielders across Europe who have been successful; Andrea Pirlo is the obvious example, but even in Marcotti's article, Guardiola acknowledged that Pirlo's role was possible at Milan as they played 'a different brand of soccer'. David Pizarro at Roma is another – but again, Roma have played a highly unconventional system in recent years. Pizarro struggled at Inter when in a standard 4-4-2; maybe we can deduce that the ball-playing midfielder only found favour in unusual formations for much of the decade.

Nor should one infer that Guardiola created Xavi and Iniesta – they were already established at the club. But it is widely acknowledged that they were hugely inspired by Guardiola as youngsters, and they were not always fixtures in the Barcelona side under Frank Rijkaard – in their previous Champions League triumph in 2006, both started the final on the bench as Barcelona fielded two holding midfielders.

So despite what everybody expected at the turn of the century, power has not defeated trickery – in fact, the opposite has occurred - technical quality is more important than ever. Re-read those quotes from Guardiola again, and the description seems like a different world. And so whilst redundant as a player six years ago, Guardiola's philosophy is now the toast of Europe as a manager.

The ultimate irony? When Guardiola took over as Barcelona manager, he was just 37 years of age. As mentioned earlier, his physical attributes were never his selling point (whilst his consummate professionalism means he would have kept himself in good shape), and his passing ability would have remained. Therefore, it's not unreasonable to suggest that the 37-year-old Guardiola probably still could have done a decent job many La Liga or Serie A midfields. His career may have been curtailed prematurely, but how wonderful that this allowed him to entrench his philosophy upon modern soccer so soon.

And therefore the most fascinating aspect of soccer tactics in the 2000s was the fall – and rise – of Guardiolaism.

2. CLASSIC NUMBER 10S STRUGGLE

The decade started with the most attacking, open tournament in modern soccer, at Euro 2000. The four semi-finalists all played 'classic' Number 10s in the hole between the opposition defence and midfield. France, Italy, Portugal and Holland had Zinedine Zidane, Francesco Totti, Manuel Rui Costa and Dennis Bergkamp respectively – it almost seemed essential to have a player in this mould to be successful – helped by trequartista-less England and Germany's early exits.

Today, the past two World Players of the Year – Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo – have been primarily wide players who cut inside. Messi and Wayne Rooney would surely have been deployed as trequartistas (or enganches, if you prefer) had they started their career a decade earlier. Indeed, almost every player that would have expected to spend their career behind the front two has had to redefine their game, generally being stationed out wide. As always, playing in a wide role generally requires a fair degree of pace, and in that respect the likes of Messi, Rooney, Andriy Arshavin or Franck Ribery have no problems, and have their place in the modern game. Ronaldo, Rooney, Arshavin, Messi and Totti also been the most prominent five to have filled a false nine role when required.

But what of the players who have neither the necessary qualities to play upfront, nor the pace and trickery to play out wide? Investigating Argentina's production of "New Maradonas" also takes you down a path that could equally be "Players that failed to live up to their potential": Juan Riquelme, Pablo Aimar, Andres D'Alessandro and Javier Saviola. That is not to say that they have not been successful for periods – Aimar and Saviola in particular were great for Valencia and Barcelona respectively – but it is undeniable that none of that quartet have achieved what we expected of them.

This is possibly a problem with South America and Europe differing in tactical terms. The 'enganche' is still a major role – THE major role – across most of South America, but Europe has largely moved away from the use of a No 10 behind the forwards. It is surely no coincidence that so many "New Maradonas" have come from Argentina and struggled to make a long-term impact in Europe, but the one Argentinian who has (already) achieved the most – Messi – arrived in Europe at the age of 13 and therefore had a distinctly 'European' soccer education.

Jonathan Wilson describes Riquelme as "the last of the old-style playmakers", contrasting him with Luka Modric, a busier, more adaptable and reliable player as "the first of the new". He makes the point that by having a 'designated' playmaker, the side becomes too dependent upon him. The players in this role are genuinely thought of (especially in Argentina) as enigmatic artists who produce individual moments of genius, and yet they are expected to be the most consistent players in the side. That was perhaps possible when 4-4-2s played each other, and there was a simple 'destroyer v creator' midfield battle, but with the popularity of 4-3-3s making the centre of midfield increasingly congested, it's simply not possible for players to play the role Zidane, Rui Costa or Totti did around the turn of the century.

How many old-style No 10s currently play for a major club in one of the top leagues in Europe? Kaka is one, certainly, although he's spent most of his career playing in a Milan side that simply played a different style of soccer to every other club in Europe. Their tendency to pack the midfield with central playmakers – up to 4 of them – meant that Kaka was not the only creative outlet in the centre of the side, and Milan still played well even when Kaka had a poor game. Indeed, even at his peak Kaka was relatively inconsistent – certainly more so than Ronaldo or Messi were when winning their World Player of the Year trophies. He doesn't have quite such a luxury at Real Madrid, and has struggled so far.

His fellow Brazilian Diego of Juventus is another – a wonderfully-talented player, but has hardly been at his best since signing for Juve, whilst Totti today plays more as a forward than as a trequartista. Wesley Sneijder has thrived playing as a No 10 this season, but equally can play on the flank if needed, much like Pavel Nedved was able to. Other sides play central playmakers – Cesc Fabregas, Steven Gerrard and Frank Lampard – but they are all more complete, busier players than the likes of Riquelme. Yoann Gourcuff is probably the closest to a top-class European old-style playmaker - but with due respect to Ligue 1, he'll have to perform either in a better league, or in a major international tournament, before he is truly considered a world class player.

And so we are left with the conclusion that there are no New Rui Costas or New Dennis Bergkamps for the time being – unless there is a shift back towards Classic Number 10s, we're more likely to hear about the New Cristiano Ronaldo or the New Wesley Sneijder.

3. THE DECLINE OF THREE-MAN DEFENSE

It's a shame that the three-man defence has become so unfashionable in recent years, because tactically it's a lot more interesting and varied than a four-man defence. It essentially did the same job – with one fewer player, allowing the side to dominate the midfield with an extra man.

Generally, the three-man defence worked very well against a 4-4-2. In terms of man-marking, a three-man defence would utilise two-man markers with a sweeper as the spare man. Zonally, the three-man defence would shift across the pitch according to what side the ball was on. The right-sided centre-half would have to be comfortable coming to the right-back position, leaving two centre-backs in the area, leaving the central player covering the near post, and the left-sided player the far post. And vice-versa. Sides playing three-man defences were admittedly prone to sides intent on shifting the ball quickly from one wing to another, but as long as it used wing-backs capable of tracking the opposition wide midfielders, it generally worked well – and still left an extra midfielder.

The problem with a three-man defence is that it rarely works well against anything other than two strikers. Against one striker, you're left with 3 v 1 at the back – fine defensively, but clearly leaving a shortfall somewhere else in the side. Against three forwards (one central and two side), there is no natural solution in terms of marking. If your wing-backs (in a 3-4-1-2) pick up the opposition wingers (in a 4-3-3) you're left with same problem, being overmanned at the back. If your centre-backs are given the task of picking up the wingers, either they're dragged dangerously wide, or they're allowing the wingers the time and space they desire.

Furthermore, the increased emphasis upon (a) movement (b) pace and (c) versatile attacking players in the modern game means it's simply too easy for a three-man defence to be dragged out of shape. A 3-5-2 or 3-4-1-2 also left opposition full-backs free – not useful with the advent of attacking full-backs, although this was a less of a problem with a 3-4-3.

In the Premiership, there was a strange mid-late 90s obsession with three-man defences, where the majority of teams in played this way. Even the famous Arsenal backline was playing a three when Arsene Wenger took over – although he shifted them back to four when he won the title in his first full season. The craze may partly have come because of the German Euro 96 side which brilliantly played a 3-4-1-2, with an attacking sweeper in Matthias Sammer and defensive-minded, energetic wing-backs – although it also helped that almost every Premiership side played two upfront, making three at the back a useful default system.

Today, not one Premiership side has used three at the back regularly this season. Too many sides play either three- or one-man strikeforces, and whilst three at the back perhaps remains the optimum system against a 4-4-2, it's inconvenient to be switching between four and three between games. In Serie A the three-man defence is refreshingly the system of choice for Genoa, Napoli and (sometimes) Palermo – but all have players and managers capable of shifting from a 3-4-1-2 to a 4-3-1-2 when necessary, something Premiership teams have rarely had the ability to do.

Interestingly, the only two sides on ZM's "Teams of the Decade" feature that used a back three are also the two oldest teams on the list, the Roma side of 2000/01 and the Brazil side of 2002.

Internationally, four at the back remains the defence of choice for all major European nations, and indeed every major contender for this World Cup. Chile is a notable exception, where Marcelo Bielsa fields an exciting 3-3-1-3 shape, and it will be interesting to see how opponents fare against the rare challenge of trying to break down a three-man defence.

Egypt have stuck to a 3-4-1-2 under Hassan Shehata and have won the last three Africa Nations Cups as a result, against sides from a continent still fixated on 4-4-2, but they've faced the usual problems against other systems. They won't be at the World Cup because they lost in the play-off to (on paper) a much weaker Algeria side, which matched their 3-4-1-2. Considering how badly England played for much of the recent friendly at home to Egypt, it will be interesting to see if they face the same problems against the similarly-laid out Algeria side in South Africa, or if they've learnt their lessons.

The three-man defence is a real thing of beauty when fielded correctly. Serie A has been fascinating because of the aforementioned three sides' tendency to play three-man defences, and tactical obsessives regardless of nationality should be backing Chile this summer, hoping success for Bielsa will trigger copycat formations across the world.

4. OFF-THE-BALL MOVEMENT

Movement is not a new thing in soccer – as outlined by Jonathan Wilson in Inverting The Pyramid, the hallmark of the legendary Hungary side which famously beat England 6-3 in 1953 was their players' tendency to drift out of their natural position and switch with teammates, thereby confusing the opposition about who they were supposed to be marking.

But there seems to have been a resurgence in the popularity and importance of 'good movement' in recent years. The main effect of good off-the-ball movement in modern soccer is that it draws the opposition out of position, hopefully creating space in a key area. If you're a striker, being marked by a center-back, then coming deep toward the play in midfield will either leave you unmarked and free for a pass, or tempt the center-back to follow you, therefore opening up space in the heart of the defence.

But that is only really effective if you have another player who can exploit the space. In the 4-4-2, a classic example of how movement worked was for one striker to drop deep, bring a centre-back with him, and then his strike partner would make a lateral run across the defence to move into the space created. But this is fairly basic; because attack and midfield were a considerable distance from each other in a 4-4-2, it was reasonably difficult for the two to interchange fluidly through movement. The shift towards four-band formations has the natural effect of narrowing the gap between the forward(s) and any onrushing midfield players, meaning it is a lot easier to exploit the space created by the movement from a forward. Whereas in a 4-4-2 it was often simply a case of one forward assisting another, in a 4-2-3-1 formation, for example, a run from the lone striker can create space for one of three supporting players, with the widemen considerably closer than they would be in a 4-4-2.

And of course the reverse can apply (a winger creating space for a forward), there can be a knock-on effect (an attacking midfielder creating space for a more defensive midfielder) and with the advent of attacking full-backs, wide players often create space for full-backs on the overlap. In short, the fact that four band formations are naturally more fluid than three-band formations has increased the importance of movement.

The resurgence of focus on movement probably started with Arrigo Sacchi's Milan side. As Paolo Maldini has said (also taken from ITP): "Before Sacchi came to Milan, the clash between two opposing players was always the key, but with him it was all about movement off the ball, and that's where we won our matches".

This should be understood in relation to other aspects of modern soccer – an increased focus on ball retention in midfield makes movement in attacking positions more valuable, whilst the increased pace of modern soccer players and the tendency to play on the counter-attack (primarily because there is more space to exploit) have also contributed.

Good movement is important in all attacking positions, and the popularity of the lone striker has made it particularly vital for certain types of players who play in that role. A particular master of it was Pedro Pauleta (above), the Portuguese striker. Whereas ten years ago the primary aim of lone strikers was to hold the ball up, today they are increasingly concerned with making intelligent runs off the ball – hence why players such as Wayne Rooney and Liedson can be fielded on their own upfront, and this also partly explains the rise of the false nine.

5. BACK TO FOUR "BANDS" IN FORMATIONS

Outfield soccer positions are still generally broken down into three types: defenders, midfielders and forwards. Go to any fantasy soccer website, or look at a UEFA squad list, and you'll see players broken down into these three categories. Of course, this ignores the progression of soccer tactics in recent years, where the pitch is often broken into four 'bands'.

To put it basically, the midfield has been separated into two bands – midfielders are either defensive, or attacking (with some forwards able to drop deeper and play in the attacking band). Strangely, this is essentially a return to the system used fifty years ago, when the W-M formation (effectively a 3-2-2-3) dominated the game.

The shift back to four probably started with the success of the deep-lying forward, who played between the lines of opposition defence and midfield, creating what often became a 4-4-1-1 shape. If the deep-lying forward was supported by wingers, the shape suddenly became a 4-2-3-1, perhaps summed up best by Arsene Wenger's Arsenal side, which although was a fairly classic 4-2-3-1, was essentially a natural conversion of a 4-4-2.

With the deep-lying forward drawing either a central midfielder or a central defender out of position in a three-band system, the obvious response was to 'match' the four bands – whether it be through replicating the 4-2-3-1, or a Chelsea-style 4-3-3 (which was effectively a 4-1-2-3) and then both sides are playing in four bands.

This has caused problems for two types of players who naturally fall into neither band. Firstly, the box-to-box midfielder has effectively ceased to exist, as outlined by Jonathan Wilson. Defensive midfielders defend, attacking midfielders attack. There are players who can defend and attack, and can play in either midfield band (Michael Ballack or Anderson, for example) but they rarely fill both tasks at once. This can also partially be attributed to the increasing importance of pace in the modern game – with more teams playing on the counter-attack and those attacks happening at breakneck speed, it simply is less possible for midfielders to constantly sprint between opposing areas for 90 minutes to support both defence and attack. Twenty years ago, when the game was slower, it was achieveable.

The other type of player affected is the wide midfielder who lacks pace. Speedy wide players can easily become a winger in a 4-3-3 or a 4-2-3-1. But it's difficult to function on the wing in that attacking band if you're not quick. The classic example is David Beckham. In a 4-2-3-1 does he become a holding midfielder, or an attacking winger? He doesn't have the defensive skills to play the former, nor the pace to play the latter. When he arrived this season at Milan, who play an attacking 4-3-3, no-one really knew where he was going to play, and he doesn't really seem comfortable at wide right, nor in central midfield. Although he retains his place in the England squad, it's difficult to see him starting on the right-hand side (in a system which has been described as a 4-4-2 but is really a loose 4-2-3-1) because of his lack of pace – hence why Aaron Lennon, Theo Walcott and even Shaun Wright-Phillips appear to be ahead in the pecking order for a starting place.

How will this progress in the future? With the advent of strikerless formations, we may see systems such as 4-3-3-0 that effectively 'ignore' the traditional striking band. Or we may simply see more systems like Brazil's, which is hard to categorize and therefore hard for opposing defenders and midfielders to understand who they should be picking up.

6. THE DEATH OF THE "POACHER"

If you could travel back to the mid 90s and ask 100 soccer fans who the best finisher in the Premiership was, you'd find a majority telling you the answer was Robbie Fowler. He wasn't tall, he wasn't fast, he wasn't strong and he wasn't mobile, but if you gave him the ball, he would put it into the net with alarming regularity.

Looking across the Premiership today, it's hard to identify any similar top-level players. There are some great goalscorers, but none as lacking in pace or skill as Fowler. The only strikers you would describe as a 'great finishers' are also blessed with speed, such as Fernando Torres, Jermain Defoe or Darren Bent. Other 'out-and-out strikers' like Bobby Zamora or Emile Heskey are in the side as much for their hold-up play as their goalscoring ability. It's simply not enough to be a goalscorer any more, you have to contribute to the team's overall game.

It's incredible to think that Fowler is only 34 years of age – the same age as David Beckham. Beckham maintains his place in the England squad, while Fowler finds himself on the bench for North Queensland Fury in the Australian A-League. Fowler's lack of fitness has played a part in his decline, but the truth is that he is simply a player left behind by the pace, movement and intelligence needed in the modern soccer game. His career as a top-level player was probably over at the age of just 27 when he signed for Kevin Keegan's Manchester City in 2003. Is Michael Owen, post-injury and with little pace, a similar story? Perhaps, although Owen has at least adapted his game to become more of an all-rounder.

Despite how popular he was, you very rarely hear young players being described as 'the new Robbie Fowler' these days. That label was given briefly to Eduardo when he signed for Arsenal as an unknown left-footed striker with a tremendous goalscoring record, but Eduardo is a much more complete player than that, and has often played on the left of a forward three, something Fowler would never have been able to do.

Indeed, if you were to select one current Premiership player who is purely a finisher, it might well be Tim Cahill of Everton, and yet he plays as a midfielder, making late runs into the box.

Even Ruud van Nistelrooy, perhaps the classic goalpoacher and the third most-prolific Premiership striker ever in terms of goals per game, was happily dumped by Manchester United because he didn't have the all-round game to feature in a top-level modern side. His goalscoring record was astonishing – 150 goals in 219 games, but the important statistics involve the peformance of the team. Manchester United won the league three times in a row in the three seasons before his arrival, and won the league three times in a row in the three seasons after he left. Whilst he was there? United won just one title in five years.

The striker as we knew him is now dead.

7. SQUAD ROTATION

Although this doesn't directly concern on-field tactics, the concept of squad rotation has become almost mandatory for the top sides in Europe, and has a large impact on the team selection of the managers concerned.

In 1980-81, Aston Villa won the league, their first title for 71 years. The most remarkable statistic was not their points total, their 'goals scored' or 'goals against' column, it was the number of players they used. In 42 league games, they used just 14 players – a number which today would be equalled by most Premiership sides within one match. Bremner, Cowans, Deacy, Evans, Geddis, Gibson, McNaught, Morley, Mortimer, Rimmer, Shaw, Swains, Williams, Withe. Count them – 14 players. Seven of them started all 42 matches.

How many players do you think Sir Alex Ferguson used as Manchester United won the title last season (2008-09)?The answer is 33 - twice as many as Aston Villa in 1980-81!

Indeed, Ferguson has revolutionised the squad game on two separate ocassions, in the two seasons United have won the Champions League. In 1998-99, United were the first side to effectively have four strikers worthy of a first-team place – Dwight Yorke and Andy Cole had a great partnership, but Teddy Sheringham and Ole Gunnar Solskjaer were arguably better soccer players, meaning Ferguson could rest his first-choice players without a loss in quality. Even in the FA Cup semi-final replay against Arsenal at Villa Park, Ferguson was confident enough to leave out his stars – Andy Cole wasn't in the squad, whilst Paul Scholes, Dwight Yorke and Ryan Giggs – who would come on and score that goal – were all on the bench.

This concept effectively set the tone for the next decade, but then, when they won both the league and Champions League in 2007-08, United upped the ante again. Amazingly, they didn't name an unchanged side the whole season – there was, in effect, no established first choice XI, and yet they still managed to be victorious in the biggest two competitions.

Pep Guardiola's Barcelona side supports a similar concept. Last season, it, too didn't go unchanged all season – and Guardiola has named the same combination of players only twice in the league. Rafa Benitez constantly has been criticized at Liverpool for rotating his players, but it's not the rotation that is the problem: It is the lack of depth in the squad and the lack of quality in the first team when Gerrard and Torres aren't playing, which means the rotation doesn't work.

So why has rotation become such a key feature?

Firstly, the expansion of the Champions League means the big sides play more games, which inevitably results in tired players, and means you can't start with the same line-up every game. (Indeed, the season after Villa won the league with 14 players, they went on to win the European Cup – but the extra games were to the detriment of their domestic form, and they only finished in 11th place.) If you want to compete on multiple fronts, you're going to play up to 60 games a season, and it's near-impossible for all but the very top athletes to perform to their best that frequently.

The main reason, of course, is the increased pace and intensity of modern soccer, which puts huge demands on soccer players. Perhaps a misconception is that players are rested solely so they don't become 'tired'. Tired is the wrong word to use – implying that the players are in some way unfit, or incapable of lasting the 90 minutes. It is more that they are unable to play every game at 100% intensity. It is far better to have two players rotating, and therefore able to give 100% each time they play, than to have a player able to get through each minute of each game, but doing so playing at only 70% of his ability.

As Rui Faria, Jose Mourinho's trusted fitness coach, explains:

"To do rotation you need to think about two or three games at the same time. Normally you change three players, four maximum, without losing the structure and balance of the team. A left-back for a left-back, a right-winger for a right-winger. The question is to know your team well and the performance of the player in that moment."

Another reason for changing teams is that players are more frequently injured today, because they are fitter than ever before. This might seem like a contradiction – but use the analogy of a Formula 1 car, where about one-quarter break down each Grand Prix, which is held over the course of about 200 miles. And yet, if you drove your Ford Focus between Birmingham and London twenty times and it broke down on five ocassions, you'd quite rightly be unhappy. But just as the lack of reliability is the cost of making a car go at fast as an F1 car, the susceptibility to injuries is the cost of having incredibly fit soccer players. Mick McCarthy was heavily criticized for fielding a virtual reserve side away to Manchester United in December, but he actually has the right idea:

"I read an article where Carlo Ancelotti had said that the risk of injury in one game is 10%. And then that goes up to 30% or 40% if another intensive game follows in three or four days. We believe that anyway, but that came from the Milan Lab research centre set up by AC Milan."

Rotation still isn't fully accepted by supporters, and certainly not by the mainstream media. Every time a club signs a big-name player in a position they are already well-stocked in, the issue arises of 'how they will fit into the team', ignoring the fact that, as United and Barcelona have shown, there isn't as strict a 'first team' as there used to be. Similarly, match reporters often announce teams by detailing that 'United have made four changes to their side...' before listing said changes and moving on to the opposition, assuming we know the players that contested the previous game.

Nevertheless, a squad rotation system is a fundamental part of any top-level modern soccer club."

8. PACE

here isn't a great deal to say about this one . In the past 10 years, pace has become arguably the most important quality for young soccer players.

The reason for this probably lies in the increasing tendency for teams to play on the counter-attack. The idea of the counter-attack is not a new invention – as long ago as Herbert Chapman-era Arsenal in the 1930s, there was a belief that teams could attack for too long, and there was value in drawing the opposition onto you, in order to open up space for your forwards to exploit. But the nature of modern soccer – more technically gifted players, pristine pitches perfect for passing on, and defenders less able to escape bookings for cynical fouls – has meant that counter-attacking has become a major feature of almost every top club in Europe, and pace obviously plays a key role in this.

The Arsenal side of seventy years later offers a good comparison. Theo Walcott versus Sebastian Larsson. Who is the better player on the ball? Walcott is a good dribbler; Larsson is more able to pick out an intelligent pass. But because Theo Walcott can sprint 100m in eleven seconds, and Larsson is quite sluggish (by Premiership standards), Walcott has been given four seasons' worth of opportunities to impressin the Arsenal first team, whilst Larsson was discarded after only three league appearances, with an Arsenal coach hinting at the time that Larsson's lack of pace made him incompatible with Arsenal's system.

Take away the issue of pace, and there's not that much difference in ability between the two. Indeed, it could be said that Walcott relies on his pace as much as any Premiership soccerer today – Pete Gill at Football365 (perhaps slightly harshly) commented in the wake of Arsenal's 0-3 defeat to Chelsea: "It's just incredible that a soccer player of Theo Walcott's stature has so little soccer talent. But for his pace he wouldn't be a professional player. He has nothing else." Walcott's own father puts it more politely, saying that "pace has been his killer edge over others."

But of course, you can't take away the issue of pace, which is why Larsson is now at a mid-table club, and Walcott remains challenging at the top of the league.

9. VERSATILE ATTACKING PLAYERS

The great attacking players of the late 1990s were easy to pin down to specific positions. Gabriel Batistuta, George Weah and Ronaldo were central forwards; Zinedine Zidane and Manuel Rui Costa were central playmakers; Luis Figo, Ryan Giggs and Marc Overmars were wingers.Today, even established great players seem to face arguments about what their best position is. Cristiano Ronaldo is traditionally a winger but increasingly plays upfront, Lionel Messi started as a classic Argentine No 10 in a central playmaking position, then became established as a wide forward, now occasionally plays up top. No-one seems decided on Wayne Rooney's best position – 'in the hole' behind a striker, upfront himself, or as a wide player helping to track back? There are exceptions, of course – Zlatan Ibrahimovic or Fernando Torres remain undeniably strikers, but it doesn't negate the argument that many top players simply don't have a 'favoured position' these days.

There are five reasons why this has occurred:
First, the dominant system has changed across Europe from 4-4-2, to 4-2-3-1 or 4-5-1 / 4-3-3. This has meant the decline of the old-fashioned wide midfielder in the David Beckham mould, and the advance of the winger who plays higher up the pitch – therefore more likely to be pacey, direct and a decent finisher. In the meantime, the desire for the central striker to be both fast and good on the ball has led to an inevitable similarity between the players who occupy wide and central forward positions. (Hence, a Thierry Henry or an Andriy Arshavin can comfortably fill either the central striking position or the wide forward role, but neither would be effective in a wide role in a 4-4-2.) There is the more simple argument, of course, that with the pitch increasingly being broken into four sections (4-2-3-1) rather than three (4-4-2), it's simply a smaller distance away from a forward's comfort zone to play wide in a 4-2-3-1 compared to a 4-4-2.

Second, the rise of the squad game. This will be covered in greater deal later on in this mini-series, but there is little doubt that the depth and quality of the squads of top teams has increased hugely in the past ten years. Squad rotation is no longer a questionable concept, it is a must. So, simple mathematics dictates that if you have four forwards competing for three forward positions, you're going to need at least one (probably more) to be able to fill more than role effectively, or else you'll be forced to exclude one player from the rotation system and play him every game, to the detriment of his ability to play well each game. Therefore a player like Cristiano Ronaldo, who can play multiple roles, becomes a necessity more than a luxury.

Third, the importance placed upon movement in the modern game. Again, this will be covered in greater depth at a later date, but good, intelligent movement has become the key to unlocking opposition defences. This means both that (a) Players will often end up finishing an attacking move in a different position to which they started it, and then remain there and (b) As this continues to happen over a sustained period of time, the player will adapt to the different role and become comfortable there.

Fourth, there is an argument that playing attacking players in different roles effectively 'is' modern soccer tactics. Almost every top European side sets up with four defenders and (at least) two central midfield players. There is little sign of a three-man defence, for example. Therefore formations boils down to managers playing attacking players in different roles each week to outwit opponents.

Lastly, youth development of a player's tactical roles has become more advanced, particularly abroad. It is players from Spain, Portugal and Holland who are amongst the most comfortable in 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1 systems. Whilst English soccer has traditionally trained players to be comfortable in 4-4-2 and 4-4-2 alone, foreign clubs have been much more adept as developing players as versatile. As Jose Mourinho says, 'I can't believe that in England they don't teach young players to be multi-functional. To them it's just about knowing one position and playing that position. For me, a striker is not a striker. He is somebody who has to move, who has to cross, and who has to do this in a 4-4-2 or in a 3-5-2, each of which is different.'

The concept of an attacking player being versatile is not a new invention, of course – Bobby Charlton, for one, played numerous roles throughout his career. But today, being versatile is crucial. In the 1990s it was not unusual to look upon a player comfortable in different roles as a bit of a pain, especially at international level: players like Paul Merson or Enrico Chiesa were probably ten years before their time.

10. THE ADVENT OF ATTACKING FULLBACKS

England's first competitive fixture of the 2000s saw them start with the Neville brothers in the full-back positions. England's first competitive fixture of the 2010s will see Ashley Cole and Glen Johnson there – the shift in that position from solid, reliable players to pacey, positive players could not be more marked. It's difficult to say when it became clear that full-backs' attacking qualities were so important. The basic reason they became crucial is that they were constantly the only players in any real space. If a 4-4-2 plays a 4-4-2, with wide midfielders picking up wide midfielders, full-backs are the only players left with space in front of them to move forward (below left) meaning they often see as much as the ball as any other player on the park. Consequently, post-game statistics also show that full-backs generally run a greater distance than any other player.

The fashion was epitomised by Arsene Wenger's Arsenal side in the early part of the decade. Having inherited a side which contained two classic 'old school' full-backs in Lee Dixon and Nigel Winterburn, Arsene Wenger replaced them with two players who weren't even defenders when Wenger first saw them. Ashley Cole was a promising forward in the Arsenal youth team, whilst Lauren had impressed for Mallorca as a ball-playing midfielder. That Wenger deliberately chose to drop more offensive players into the full-back positions demonstrates quite how important it was that his full-backs were excellent on the ball. The same happened around Europe. Gianluca Zambrotta (right), a promising right-winger in his early days at Bari and Juventus, was switched to left-back by Marcello Lippi, and became the best full-back in the world.

Jonathan Wilson, the guru on soccer tactics, now believes that full-backs are now the most important players in the team.

The situation has now developed so far that wide midfielders are often deployed primarily to stop the opposition full-backs advancing – Sir Alex Ferguson has done this brilliantly in recent years – Wayne Rooney and Park Ji-Sung play this role excellently and Antonio Valencia did a superb job on Ashley Cole earlier in the season.

Failure to do this can be suicidal – Tottenham capitulated against Arsenal at the Emirates because they fielded no left-sided midfielder, allowing Bacary Sagna the freedom to get two assists, whilst Arsenal's similar mistake on the same pitch against Chelsea allowed Ashley Cole to cross twice within three minutes for two identical goals.

How long the prevalence of 'attacking' full-backs will continue remains to be seen – with many sides fielding their most creative, dangerous players in wide attacking positions (Lionel Messi, Andrei Arshavin, Ronaldinho, Cristiano Ronaldo), there is perhaps more need for full-backs to be strong defensively, compared to the start of the 2000s when there was a dearth of wide players, and many sides used central attacking playmakers.